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Abstract
The increasing similarity between the economic policies of center-left and center-right political parties has
effectively diminished the legitimacy of governments in relationship to their citizenry in Western Europe and
the U.S. Capitalist democracies during the period of managed capitalism gained legitimacy by the appearance
of the separation of capitalist ownership rights in the marketplace from the political institutions that govern
capitalism. During this period, Social Democratic parties in Western Europe, and to a lesser extent the
Democratic Party in the U.S., paid some amount of attention to labor unions and mass constituents in
formulating their policy agendas. The era of neoliberalism (late 1970s to the present) has broken any such
appearances, with the dominant political parties, regardless of party label, moving rightward to embrace many
of the same economic policy agendas.
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  The increasing similarity between the economic policies of center-left and center-right 
political parties has effectively diminished the legitimacy of governments in relationship to their 
citizenry in Western Europe and the U.S.  Capitalist democracies during the period of managed 
capitalism gained legitimacy by the appearance of the separation of capitalist ownership rights in 
the marketplace from the political institutions that govern capitalism.  During this period, Social 
Democratic parties in Western Europe, and to a lesser extent the Democratic Party in the U.S., 
paid some amount of attention to labor unions and mass constituents in formulating their policy 
agendas.  The era of neoliberalism (late 1970s to the present) has broken any such appearances, 
with the dominant political parties, regardless of party label, moving rightward to embrace many 
of the same economic policy agendas.  This includes support by both center-left and center-right 
parties for the central components of what is often referred to as “neoliberalism”:  reduction in 
social welfare spending, support for privatization of essential public services, deregulation of 
health and safety regulations, erosion of anti-trust laws, reduced taxes on the wealthiest citizens, 
and the globalization of markets on terms negotiated by corporate elites.1  This increasing 
sameness of economic policy agendas on the part of mainstream political parties has coincided 
with lower voter turnout, dramatic reductions in public legitimacy—reflecting a rise in public 
distrust of governments and a belief that governments are run by the wealthy for the wealthy, and 
the emergence of third parties in Europe that are often dominated by the far right of the spectrum 
including xenophobic and openly racist and fascistic parties.2  Instead of capitalist crises leading 
to the emergence of left-wing alternatives, which is currently the case in Greece and potentially 
Spain, the current strength of far right parties has eclipsed the ability of a coherent left to mount 
an effective counter-attack.   
 The inability of capitalist economic crises to generate the emergence of mass movements 
on the left is a puzzle worthy of further reflection.  Left-wing scholars and activists have 
grappled with this question over the past two decades, and have managed to develop some 
theories as to why a left based in working class constituencies has not emerged to challenge the 
neoliberal consensus of policy-making elites.  A full explanation is complex and cannot be 
reduced to only one variable.  The emergence of a transnational global capitalism in which 
production is increasingly dispersed across the borders of states has fractured the ability of 
workers to defend themselves at the nation-state level.3  The interest of transnational capital has 
been thoroughly globalized and protected through as a many as 400 investment agreements 
signed between capitalist states during the 1990s and 2000s.4  At the same time, workers are 
restricted from moving across borders which are increasingly policed and militarized.  Those 
who have been allowed to cross the borders of nation-states face high-levels of marginalization, 
policing, and criminalization, further solidifying the structural power of capital both 
economically and politically.5  Right-wing forces have been able to take advantage of these 
circumstances to wax nostalgic about the “loss of national heritage” in appeals to groups of white 
workers who are willing to accept such claims, generating increasing levels of support for neo-
fascist groups.  Meanwhile the parties in power of the center-left and center-right are quick to 
use immigrant labor as a scapegoat for broader societal problems, further lending legitimacy to 
far-right hate groups, and repeating historical patterns. 
 While important, the impact of structural global factors in explaining the drift of parties 
to the right of the political spectrum is not sufficient in explaining the lack of a clear left 
alternative.  The institutional features of governance in an age of neoliberal capitalism need to be 
inserted into the equation to fully grapple with the politics of the right-turn.  But for skeptics, it is 
first necessary to show that this right-turn does exist across a range of states with diverse 
institutional and class histories.  Fortunately, scholars have a tool to measure such shifts in policy 
preferences over time known as the Mapping Policy Preferences database, which examines the 
extent to which political parties of differing labels have adopted similar neoliberal policies while 
in positions of power in Western Europe and in North America.  From the 1990s to the present, 
the trends from this database are quite clear:  regardless of institutional differences or levels of 
commitment to social democracy, the trajectory of Social Democratic Parties in Europe and the 
Democratic Party in the U.S. show remarkable convergence in their support of neoliberal 
policies.6  That means that ostensibly center-left parties have moved to embrace many of the 
tenets of neoliberal orthodoxy in supporting reductions in welfare spending, privatization of 
social services, “competition policy” that has served as a justification for greater liberalization of 
markets on terms highly favorable to corporate interests, and reductions in the tax and regulatory 
obligations of the upper income strata of their populations.  The extent to which center-left 
political parties have turned in favor of neoliberalism, even in Scandinavian countries with a 
longer commitment to Keynesian redistribution, requires some amount of explanation. 
 The first part of the equation is the greater structural and instrumental power of capitalist 
political organizations which were central in promoting neoliberal policies at the highest levels 
of policymaking.  This is not strictly a matter of lobbying, although there have been expansive 
networks of corporate lobbying in the U.S., Canada and Western Europe, led by the Business 
Roundtable in the U.S., the International Chambers of Commerce and the European Roundtable 
of Industrialists in Europe.7  The most powerful corporate groups can minimize overt lobbying 
by exerting a more profound influence on policymaking through the process of agenda-setting, 
which entails the establishment of policy foundations funded by transnational corporate actors 
that can establish the parameters within which policy debates occur.  For example, the policy 
technocrats within the European Union are advised by a network of well-connected policy 
foundations that do the bidding of their corporate donors, whose interests are often cloaked in the 
garb of technocratic problem-solving “solutions” to policy dilemmas.  Much of the deregulatory 
and market liberalization policies in the European Union owe their existence to a well-
established network of policy associations with deep ties to transnational capital.8  Similarly, 
corporate networks have been directly involved in the negotiation of as many as 400 investment 
agreements led by the European Union and the U.S. that have helped establish the terms for the 
globalization of production, including corporate supply chains that have weakened the ability of 
labor unions to counter the negative effects of “free trade”.9  The overwhelming representation of 
corporate elites as partners with political elites on both the center-right and center-left of the 
spectrum in establishing the specific policies embedded within these investment agreements goes 
a long way towards showcasing the entrenched nature of corporate power.  Here there is little 
difference between Social Democrats in Europe and their Conservative counterparts; just as there 
is little difference in the U.S. between the Democrats and the Republicans. 
 The second part of the puzzle is more subtle but also significant:  the professionalization 
of party hierarchies in the institutionalized discourse of neoliberalism has made their policy 
orientation closer to each other than their rhetoric or oppositional discourse would appear.  Even 
in the U.S., where the scholarly literature of American politics has spilt much ink talking about 
the polarization of political parties, the polarization has occurred within an overarching agenda 
of neoliberalism.  It was the Clinton Administration, after all, that not only embraced but 
implemented many of the neoliberal policies supported by the Reagan Administration in the 
1980s:  a move toward balanced budgets that saw an increase in reductions of federal social 
welfare expenditures in the neoliberal era, an emphasis on criminalization and policing in federal 
justice policies, a further deregulation of the banking sector that reached its height in wide 
bipartisan support for the elimination of the Glass-Steagall Act which eliminated the already 
weakened barriers separating commercial and investment banking.10  While the Clinton 
Administration did support the increases in tax rates for the upper two percent of taxpayers, the 
increase was not enough to offset its support for corporate restructuring and tax loopholes that 
further the neoliberal globalization agenda, not to mention its support and leadership in passing 
NAFTA—which became the model of corporate-backed investment agreements over the next 
twenty years. In other words, the regressivity of the Reagan era was codified and solidified by a 
Clinton Administration that talked of a “third way” whose rhetoric was designed to bypass 
association with traditional conservative or liberal policy proposals, but in fact gave ideological 
cover to neoliberal policy measures.  Given the history of Democratic convergence with the 
neoliberal policy agenda, which actually starts with Democratic President Jimmy Carter, there is 
clearly a cavernous gap between political scientists’ contention that the parties are “polarized” 
and the rather overwhelming evidence that both parties have pursued neoliberal policy agendas.   
Squaring the circle of this apparent discrepancy is an interesting task, and one that can 
only be tackled in a more detailed article than this one.  But one part of the explanation for party 
polarization rests more on cultural and “identity” issues than class issues.11  The extent to which 
Republican and Democratic Party elites diverge from one another is often expressed in social 
issues such as religion versus secularism, abortion rights vs. “pro-life”,  nativism vs. legal 
immigration, and individual property rights such as gun ownership, all of which are rarely if ever 
discussed in the public arena within the larger context of corporate power and class privilege but 
instead are more narrowly conceptualized as a cultural war of identity pitting those that “think 
like us” against those that “oppose our values.”  The framing of these identity and cultural issues 
contribute to a retreat from addressing class power and privilege in favor of “identity” markers, 
and has greatly contributed to the party polarization that does exist, even if it’s not polarization 
around neoliberalism, which both parties have endorsed. 
 In Western Europe, where a different set of technocratic institutional politics prevail, the 
party elites position themselves differently, as purveyors of a technocratic “wisdom” that comes 
from a regulatory and institutional structure increasingly insulated from public opinion.  Indeed, 
the very establishment of a European Union around a European Central Bank that takes its cue 
from the German Bundesbank indicates the extent to which the European project is a corporate 
project, with roots of support from the most powerful corporate actors in Europe, not the least of 
which is the European Roundtable of Industrialists.  But instead of the crass lobbying embedded 
in U.S. politics, the technocrats at the center of the regulatory apparatus of the E.U. legitimize 
the crafting of E.U. policies in the language of codified rule-making that is designed to insulate 
European elites from the more “narrow” concerns of citizens within the nation-states of Europe.  
The result has been a predictable gap between an E.U. elite that emphasizes a common European 
project, and European citizens who feel (correctly) that this project is being forced down their 
collective throats.  With Social Democrats tied to the corporatist agenda of the E.U., with its top-
down structure and its promise of social benefits and redistribution to the masses (which masks 
the neoliberalism at the heart of actual E.U. policies), the double-speak between what Social 
Democrats say about the benefits of the E.U. and how ordinary workers experience the actual 
neoliberal policies on the ground becomes harder to sustain.  The result is an E.U. bureaucracy 
that is increasingly delegitimized, as evident by the negative votes on the E.U. Constitution in 
France and the Netherlands in 2005, while other votes were either cancelled or postponed as the 
E.U. technocrats worked to move around public opposition to save their political project.  The 
latest appointments of E.U. technocrats in place of actual governing officials to preside over the 
implementation of policies in the indebted states of Greece and Italy speak volumes about the 
replacement of citizenship with corporate technocracy.12 
 The upshot of this corporate technocracy is a fusion of corporate and state power that has 
brought all mainstream parties of the center-left and center-right into collaboration on behalf of 
the market interests they serve.  To suggest, as many liberals and progressives do, that there is 
little choice but to participate fully in this plutocracy on the side of the lesser-evil is to beg the 
question:  how “lesser” do we need to get before we can talk seriously about reinvigorating 
independent social movements based on class identification that have the power to pressure the 
elites from the outside, instead of perpetually giving these elites more legitimacy to ignore, 
silence and subjugate the left.  This topic will be central to further commentary on this site. 
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